Monthly Archives: February 2016

Dixie and La Marseillaise

During the last month of his life President Lincoln enjoyed the company of a young visiting French aristocrat, Charles Adolphe Pineton who was the Marquis de Chambrun. Although he was at odds with the reigning Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte (Napoléon III), the monarch permitted the young man to visit the federal Union because Chambrun was a descendent by marriage of the Marquis de Lafayette who aided America in her revolution against Great Britain.

Marquis

On March 28, 1865 Lincoln visited his military commanders in Virginia to arrange plans for a hoped-for final offensive. He lingered until April 8th hoping to be nearby at Lee’s surrender. In the meantime his wife joined him and brought along the Marquis de Chambrun. During the visit the Frenchmen remarked upon his regret that Napoléon III forbade the playing of La Marseillaise in his home country because of its rebellious implications. When the group finally left to return to Washington Lincoln requested a nearby military band to play the revolutionary tune for his guest. Next he asked band to play Dixie. He wanted “to show the rebels that [even] with us in power they will be free to hear it again.”

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My Civil War Books

Lee’s Lost Dispatch and Other Civil War Controversies
Trading With the Enemy
Co. Aytch: Illustrated and Annotated

To be released in May and available for pre-order: The Confederacy at Flood Tide

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Secretary Stanton’s Boss

On April 15, 1865 when Andrew Johnson became president upon the death of Abraham Lincoln the former inherited Lincoln’s cabinet, which included War Secretary Edwin Stanton. On 28 May Johnson announced a Reconstruction plan based upon his executive authority. According to Stanton the plan was thoroughly discussed in the cabinet where nobody expressed any “doubt of the power of the executive branch…to reorganize the [Southern] states.”

During the next three years, however, Johnson would battle a Radical Republican Congress over Reconstruction. Stanton increasingly sided with Congress but remained in the cabinet, essentially as a spy. In order to protect Stanton’s advantageous position, on March 3, 1867 Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act over Johnson’s veto. The Act specified that no cabinet member could be removed without consent of the Senate. If the Senate were not in session, it would vote when it reconvened.

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When Johnson learned that Stanton had earlier withheld a military court’s clemency recommendation for the only female member of Lincoln’s assassin conspirators he could no longer abide the subordinate. Thus, he appointed Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant as temporary War Secretary with the understanding that if Stanton’s removal was not sanctioned by the Senate when it returned Grant would either keep his temporary title thereby enabling Johnson to take the dispute to the Supreme Court, or give Johnson time to replace Grant with another appointee who could likewise trigger judicial review. Johnson correctly believed the Tenure of Office Act to be unconstitutional. (Ironically, so did Stanton when the bill was initially submitted.)

My Civil War Books

Lee’s Lost Dispatch and Other Civil War Controversies
Trading With the Enemy
Co. Aytch: Illustrated and Annotated

To be released in May and available for pre-order The Confederacy at Flood Tide

Continue reading

Confederate Scorpions

On July 4, 1862, while the stunned 100,000-man Union Army of the Potomac licked its wounds after defeat in the Seven Days campaign, Confederate agent James Bulloch placed an order with British shipbuilder Laird & Sons for two transoceanic ironclad warships. They were designed to be superior to anything in the United States Navy. After their scheduled availability the following spring and summer, it was hoped that they would lift the Union blockade. They might even raid and destroy commercial and naval ships in Northern ports from Philadelphia to Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Bulloch, who was a Georgian and uncle to future President Theodore Roosevelt, had good reason to be optimistic. After Union spies learned of their specifications months later, Assistant Union Navy Secretary Gustavus Fox confirmed that his navy had nothing to counter the vessels. Therefore, all the tools of diplomacy and espionage needed to focus on preventing or delaying their delivery.

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Although their beaked shaped bows gave the Lairds the appearance of rams, it was not their most important feature. Eventually they would become known as Scorpion class warships, which were armored like the Union Monitor class. Unlike Monitors, however, they were seaworthy enough to reliably cross the Atlantic and give battle upon arrival. With a top speed of about fifteen knots they were more than twice as fast as the original USS Monitor, which battled the even slower CSS Virginia in the famous first battle of ironclads in March 1862. While they drew more water than the Monitors, the Lairds were designed to be shallow-drafted enough to enter, and maneuver in, major Southern ports.

My Civil War Books

Lee’s Lost Dispatch and Other Civil War Controversies
Trading With the Enemy
Co. Aytch: Illustrated and Annotated

Continue reading

Union Veteran Pension Controversy

A Pension Act for Civil War Union soldiers and sailors was adopted in February 1862. Beneficiaries were entitled to a monthly payment for those disabled during military service or, if killed, for their survivors. The amount depended upon rank. If judged disabled for manual labor, those ranked Lieutenant Colonel or above received $30 monthly whereas Privates got $8. A couple of years later the Act was amended to provide benefits specified by an itemized disabilities schedule.

Payments commenced once an application was approved. There was no pension for merely becoming aged. About 2.2 million men served in the Union military during the war. About 365,000 died and 280,000 survived wounds, meaning that less than 650,000 participants qualified for pensions. Ultimately, however, the active recipient list would peak at about one million, which means that the accumulated number of recipients was even larger.

Only eight years after the end of the war the number of beneficiaries reached an apparent peak at around 110,000 in 1873. They numbered less than 25% of all eligible veterans and survivors, including the survivors of soldiers who died of wounds after the war. The Commissioner of Pensions, James Baker, predicted that expenditures would soon stop growing when he said in 1872, “We have reached the apex of the mountain.”

Apparently, there were three reasons why only a minority of qualified veterans applied for pensions. First, most were youthful men who chose to focus on building independent livelihoods after the war. Second, some were unfamiliar with the paperwork, although lawyers were permitted to collect application fees to help. Third, others considered pensions as charity and were too proud to take handouts.

Despite Commissioner Baker’s prediction, the “apex of the mountain” was only a foothill. Annual disbursements for Union veterans pensions would not top-out until 1921, which was sixty years after the war started. Moreover, as indicted in the chart below, for thirty years between 1880 and 1910 Union veterans pensions would average more than 25% of the federal budget. They would peak at 41% in 1893. By 1917 the accumulated pensions totaled over $5 billion, which was more than twice the amount spent by the federal and Northern state governments to fight the war.

Pensions

Annual Union veterans pensions grew for more than fifty years because they became a bribe to create a Republican-loyal voter constituency. The strategy was particularly fruitful in Midwestern farm states where the Party’s high tariff and deflationary monetary policies were unpopular.

One way to enlarge the constituency was to steadily liberalize qualifications. Eventually, widows, mothers, fathers, orphans, and even orphaned siblings were allowed to qualify. Another way was to transform the disability assistance program into an old age retirement one that would include able-bodied retirees. For almost a half century after the war only a single Democrat, Grover Cleveland, was elected President. Moreover, despite a nation-wide popular vote majority Cleveland lost his bid for a second consecutive term when Benjamin Harrison narrowly beat him in Indiana and New York where veterans supplied the Republican edge. The states had 38,000 and 45,000 veterans receiving pensions respectively and gave Harrison 2,300 and 13,000 respective vote majorities.

Pension award escalation started in 1879 with adoption of an Arrears Act. Previously, beneficiaries were only permitted to collect a monthly stipend after applying for a pension. The ’79 Act basically made the application date retroactive to the date of military discharge. Thus, soldiers who left the army years earlier could collect the arrears as a lump sum. At a time when the average nonfarm worker earned less than $400 a year the average arrears payment was $1,000. Among the factors triggering the 1879 Act was powerful lobby of attorneys who earned fees for helping applicants win pension awards.

Partly because agrarian workers earned even less than nonfarm workers and partly because they contained few Union veterans, Southern states opposed the Arrears Act. Few Northern Democrats and virtually no Republicans opposed the Act. Even as late as 1901 residents of the eleven former Confederate states received less in veterans benefits than the single state of Indiana. South Carolina’s per capita amount was 20-cents as compared to $4.00 in Indiana. Northern Democrats would change their attitude after their party became more dependent upon big city immigrants who seldom qualified for such benefits. Nonetheless, one contemporary New York City magazine wrote, “the effect of this law is to stir-up a multitude [141,000] of people to apply for pensions . . . who had not realized they were disabled until the Government offered a premium of $1,000 or more . . . ”

By 1890 it was evident that Republicans were using veterans pensions as a means of keeping tariffs high in order to protect an ecosystem of Northern manufacturers. Tariffs accounted for about half of federal tax revenues even though the federal budget was consistently reporting embarrassingly large surpluses. Democrats reasoned that cutting tariffs was the best way to balance the budget and simultaneously benefit all consumers. Republicans, however, wanted to keep tariffs high. In order to balance the budget, they argued, the federal government should spend the surplus on even more liberal veterans pensions. Such advocacy was designed to strengthen their ties to Republican-loyal constituents like veterans and tariff-protected industries.

Republicans prevailed with the 1890 Dependent Pensions Act. It enlarged the number of people who could qualify for assistance. Any soldier who served a mere 90 days and wives who married veterans anytime prior to 1890 became qualified. Any soldier injured during the war who anytime later became unable to perform manual labor was covered. Within four years pension disbursements doubled from $80 million to $165 million. The budget surplus vanished and Union veterans pensions accounted for over 40% of the federal budget.

In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt declared by executive order that all veterans over age sixty-two were eligible for pensions, thereby effectively making old age a disability.

In conclusion, few Reconstruction-era historians devote sufficient attention to Union veterans pensions. Nonetheless the spending accounted for a stunningly large share of the federal budget until the eve of World War I. Pension policy was linked to protective tariffs which were injurious to consumers throughout the country and additionally to farmers—most notably Southerners—who were dependent upon exports, which could be disadvantaged by retaliatory tariffs abroad.

Finally, like interest payments on Civil War federal debt and the retirement of such debts, Union veterans pensions represented a distributive income policy that transferred income from the impoverished South to the prosperous North. For at least twenty-five years after the end of the Civil War more than half of the federal budget was composed of such income-distributive items. They continued even longer in the case of veterans’ pensions.

If the Confederacy had been an independent defeated foe such redistributive payments would have been functionally equivalent to reparations.